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The Precautionary Principle:
Its Use Within Hard and Soft Law
René von Schomberg*
The precautionary principle in public decision making concerns situations where following 
an assessment of the available scientific information, there are reasonable grounds for con-
cern for the possibility of adverse effects on the environment or human health, but scientific 
uncertainty persists. In such cases provisional risk management measures may be adopted, 
without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those adverse effects become 
fully apparent. This is the definition of the precautionary principle as operationalized un-
der EU law. The precautionary principle is a deliberative principle. Its application involves 
deliberation on a range of normative dimensions which need to be taken into account while 
making the principle operational in the public policy context. Under EU law, any risk man-
agement measures to be adopted while implementing the precautionary principle, have to 
be proportionate to ensure the chosen high level of protection in the European Community.
This article will illustrate the established practice concerning the release of genetically mod-
ified organisms into the environment and how the principle is implemented under hard law. 
The article also provides an outlook on what this may imply for the relative new case of 
nanotechnology and the use of precautionary principle within the context of soft law (use 
of codes of conduct).
I. The normative political dimension of 
decision making
At the initial level of considering the invocation of 
the precautionary principle, one has to distinguish 
between applying the precautionary principle in the 
context of a particular regulation, such as EU regu-
lations concerning Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs) and existing national laws, and the political
decision to invoke the precautionary principle for 
a particular subject matter, (such as agricultural 
biotechnology, climate change, and the protection 
of the ozone layer), before any regulation or law is 
available. At this initial level, the decision is purely 
a political one. Even if there is no existing regula-
tion regime existing in relation to the issue, such a 
political decision, is, and should be guided by a defi-
nition or general understanding of the precautionary 
principle which provides a rationale for action. Over 
recent years such a rationale and understanding have 
emerged from political discussions at the internation-
al level, and are reflected in several descriptions of 
the principle in international agreements and, in the 
EU in (apart from the formal inclusion of the precau-
tionary principle in the EU treaty) in court rulings 
of the European Court of Justice, Communications 
from the European Commission and in the general 
principles and requirements of EU food law.
In any specific case, the rationale specifies particular 
circumstances, for which the possible invocation of 
the precautionary principle is specifically reserved 
and consists of two crucial elements:
1. The principle is to be applied in cases of potential 
adverse impacts on the environment or human 
* René von Schomberg is at the Directorate-General for Research 
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health with serious consequences (thus implying 
that these consequences are unacceptable if real-
ised, see for the normative dimension concerning 
the “seriousness of these consequences,” further 
below).
2. Governmental action should be taken even though 
“complete” scientific evidence is not available, 
there is on-going scientific controversy, and/or 
there are disagreements about the lack of scien-
tific knowledge. These circumstances are referred 
to as instances of scientific uncertainty. Scientific 
uncertainties arise because of controversies over 
the possibility of adverse effects to the environ-
ment or human health, their scope or their degree 
of seriousness.
The precautionary principle establishes a rationale 
for action: it substantially lowers the threshold level 
for action by governments (and possibly, depending 
on its national implementation, makes it easier for 
governments, when citizens or interest groups appeal 
to the precautionary principle in socio-political or ju-
dicial controversies). It represents a departure from 
the previous state of affairs where political actors 
could use or abuse a persistent dissent among scien-
tists as a reason or excuse, for not taking action at all.
A similar rationale for action based on the pre-
cautionary principle has often been applied in the 
human health area. For example, the Judgements of 
5 May 1998, in cases C-157/96 and C-180/96, rulings 
of the European Court of Justice concerning its Judge-
ment on the validity of the European Commission’s 
decision banning the exportation of beef from the 
United Kingdom to reduce the transmission risk of 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or “mad-
cow disease”): “Where there is uncertainty as to the 
existence or extent of risks to human health, the 
institutions may take protective measures without 
having to wait until the reality and seriousness of 
those risks become fully apparent.” As the European 
Union treaty1 states, “Community policy on the envi-
ronment shall aim at a high level of protection taking 
into account the diversity of situations in the various 
regions of the Community.”
In the European Union, the discussion at the po-
litical level has led to firmly embed the principle 
in European policy, as it is enshrined in the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty as one of the three principles upon 
which all environmental policy is based. It has been 
progressively applied to other fields of policy, includ-
ing food safety, trade and research.
1. Chosen level of protection
Every nation state has under international agree-
ments the sovereign right to determine its own level 
of protection. For a particular nation, this level can 
either be higher or lower than the level applied by 
other nations depending on its economic situation 
and socio-political priorities. With or without the 
precautionary principle, nations can thus determine 
such a general level of protection as they deem to be 
appropriate. Having the precautionary principle in 
place does not imply any new standard setting and 
therefore does not, for instance, imply the application 
of strict (or stricter) environmental or health stand-
ards: it only changes the procedure on how nations 
can act when they want to implement their chosen 
levels of protection in the light of scientific uncer-
tainty.
When it comes to protecting the environment 
or human health, the essential normative political 
choice is thus the determination of the chosen level 
of protection. However, the level of protection is not 
always very clearly determined or defined. The EU 
treaty states only that the level of protection should 
be “high” (e.g. for environment, consumer protec-
tion, human, animal and plant health). It has been 
clarified that this does not necessarily have to be the 
highest level that is technically possible, and depend-
ing on the regulations involved, Community institu-
tions do enjoy a broad discretion, in relation to the 
determination of the level of risk deemed unaccep-
table for society. Therefore, “consistency” and “non-
discrimination” become relevant guidelines while 
invoking the precautionary principle and determin-
ing the chosen level of protection in a particular field 
and over a particular time-frame2.The precautionary 
principle can only legitimately be invoked, according 
to the above rationale, if there is a threat that this 
chosen level of protection could be violated by par-
ticular products or activities. The proper application 
of the precautionary principle has to be seen in the 
light of this chosen level of protection. The choice of 
the level of protection determines the actual stand-
ards for health and the environment which should be 
1 Consolidated versions of the treaty on European Union and of the 
treaty establishing the European community, Official Journal of the 
European Union, C325, 24 December 2002, Title XIX, article 174, 
paragraph 2 and 3.
2 Communication from the European Commission on the Precau-
tionary Principle, (COM 2000/001), Brussels.
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employed. This normative/political choice will have 
to be applied under all policies and is independent 
from the invocation of the precautionary principle.
In most cases, the level of protection is hardly 
ever defined in quantitative terms. Indeed in cases 
of significant scientific uncertainty, such quantifica-
tion is not feasible. Moreover, one is possibly not even 
sure whether the anticipated adverse effects actually 
pose a problem for our chosen level of protection 
(and therefore, possibly, should not be seen as an 
adverse effect after all) or that one is not aware of 
effects which may indeed pose such problems. Some 
asked the “so, what?” question when the spread of 
transgenes into the environment as a possible con-
sequence of the massive use of GMOs was defined 
as a possible unacceptable environmental effect3. In 
the context of climate change, for instance, there was 
a long period without clearly defined standards for 
temperature rise which were to be seen as unaccep-
table: the uncertainty of the science is related to the 
uncertainty of what still could count as acceptable 
in terms of health and environmental effects. Invok-
ing the precautionary principle, therefore, implies 
a delicate interplay between the choice of possible 
normative standards of acceptability and scientific 
assessments whether such standards would be vio-
lated without regulatory measures. While invoking 
the precautionary principle, one may in the light of 
acquisition of new knowledge, need to redefine the 
level of protection as well.
It is important to recollect at this point that the 
combination of an operational rationale of the pre-
cautionary principle and the obligation of maintain-
ing a high level of protection (accompanied with pos-
sible non-quantified standards) sets the terms of the 
debate. At this stage of our deliberation, the question 
on the use of normative qualifiers which are con-
nected to the effects which trigger the precautionary 
principle can already be clarified: the terms “nega-
tive,” “serious” or “significant” cannot be operational-
ized in a public policy context, since their use would 
start a new discussion on their degree of seriousness, 
significance etc. The only possible proper qualifier 
is therefore the “chosen level of protection,” so that 
any possible infringement of that level can count as 
“negative,” “serious,” etc. The general term “adverse” 
effect implies an infringement of that level of pro-
tection.
2. The choice and design of a particular 
framework
The political dimension of the initial invocation is 
not fully exhausted by the mere existence of a con-
stitutional or European Treaty-based rationale for the 
precautionary principle. It is important to note that 
the precautionary principle is, at the level of the EU 
treaty, a formal principle which implies that, depend-
ing on the area to which it will be applied, will result 
in quite different types of environmental policies/
regulations with a range of possible measures, which 
in themselves are in need of a proper justification. Al-
though the basic rationale justifies proactive action, 
the range of possible actions might vary considerably 
and it also raises the issue of applying the precaution-
ary principle in a consistent, non-discriminatory and 
proportional way, for all areas concerned. The Euro-
pean Commission had to set up guidelines for the 
precautionary principle’s application, among others, 
in order to tackle this issue, thereby ensuring that the 
precautionary principle can and will not be abused as 
a disguised protectionist trade measure and is com-
patible with the EU’s international obligations such 
as those under the WTO and the UN (see footnote 3). 
Two of these guidelines stand out in relation to deci-
sions with a normative political nature, namely the 
requirement of a proportional application of the pre-
cautionary principle and the requirement to examine 
the benefits and costs of action or lack of action The 
latter requirement has also been mentioned as a re-
quirement for environmental policy in the Treaty on 
the European Union (Article 172 of the Environment 
Title in footnote 2).
As far as the examination of the benefits and costs 
of action or inaction is concerned, it has to be taken 
into account that human health issues in the EU take 
precedence over economic concerns. For example, the 
Order of 30 June 1999, in Case T 70/99, Alpharma vs 
Council states: “requirements linked to the protection 
of public health should undoubtedly be given greater 
weight than economic considerations.” The Commis-
sion’s guidelines clearly state that this examination 
should not be reduced to a pure economic weighing 
of costs and benefits4.
3 Gerard De Vries (ed.), Proceedings second international work 
CCRO workshop – Commission Genetic Modification (Bilthoven: 
1999), pp. 125136.
4 Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Princi-
ple, (COM 2000/001), Brussels (previously cited) and the European 
Council Resolution on the Precautionary Principle, 2000, Brussels.
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Christoforou5 rightly points out that this type of 
consideration does not play a decisive role in whether
to adopt a precautionary principle based regulation 
or policy, but only in the actual choice or design of 
the framework. The choice and the design of the 
framework are part of political deliberations before 
they conclude in actual regulations and policies, and 
this is why this aspect of the implementation of the 
precautionary principle must be seen at the norma-
tive political level.
The EU regulation on Genetically Modified Or-
ganisms, for example, shows a particular design of a 
precautionary regulatory framework. It established a 
case by case and step by step procedure6. The frame-
work does not prejudge the acceptability of individ-
ual GMO releases. This framework thereby takes a 
normative stand on GMOs as such, since it defines 
GMOs as a priori potentially hazardous, and shifts 
the burden of proof to the proponents of the activity, 
e.g. the applier for a GMO release has to demonstrate 
safety rather than that regulatory agencies or third 
parties have to demonstrate a risk. EU regulation con-
cerning chemicals (under protest from EU industry) 
has moved in a similar direction with a mandatory 
risk assessment to be produced by the applicant. The 
European Court has also confirmed that the legisla-
tion “already makes provision, as one (italics by the 
author) of the possible ways of giving effect to the 
precautionary principle, for a procedure for prior au-
thorisation of the products concerned”7.
3. The choice of potential measures and 
the requirement of proportionality
Although the requirement of proportionality has its 
roots in the basic principles of Community Law, it 
won’t and cannot be considered a trump card that 
could override the invocation of the precautionary 
principle. Whereas the cost/benefit analysis require-
ment constrains and guides the setup of the general 
regulatory framework for policy actions, the pro-
portionality requirement relates in particular to the 
normative choice of possible alternative measures un-
der such regulations or policy actions but does not 
eliminate the precautionary principle based justifica-
tion of taking measures as such. According to Com-
munity law the principle of proportionality requires 
that measures adopted by Community institutions 
should not exceed the limits of what is appropriate 
and necessary in order to attain the legitimate ob-
jectives pursued by the legislation in question, and 
where there is a choice between several appropriate 
measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, 
and the disadvantages caused must not be dispropor-
tionate to the aims pursued.
Thus the proportionate implementation of the pre-
cautionary principle is not aimed at categorical bans 
of products or processes (which might jeopardise the 
learning process) but certainly does not exclude such 
measures in individual cases. For instance, the EU 
recently withdrew particular antibiotics in feeding 
stuffs from the market while invoking the precau-
tionary principle. A subsequent very revealing Euro-
pean Court of Justice ruling, concerning this antibiot-
ics case (Judgment Case T-70/99, Alpharma vs Council 
[2002] ECR II-3495) included a judgement relating to 
both a contested interpretation of the precautionary 
principle and the principle of proportionality. The 
Court judged this ban to be justified8.
The principle of proportionality has an impact 
on the choice of possible measures, and in the trade 
context, this could mean that one adopts measures 
that would be the least trade-restrictive. In general 
terms, the normative line of thinking here is that a 
proportionate application of the precautionary prin-
ciple involves the least onerous measure while still 
attaining the legitimate objective. However, the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice has clarified, in the context 
of the above judgement (Alpharma vs Council), that 
a cost/benefit analysis should be seen as a particular 
expression of the principle of proportionality in cases 
involving risk management. In the case of the invoca-
tion of the precautionary principle, risk management 
is by definition involved (the invocation of the pre-
cautionary principle is a risk management decision 
in the EU context) and the proportionality principle 
is integrated in the context of a broadly defined cost-
benefit analysis. The outcome of such an analysis 
can, therefore, favour an option other than the least 
onerous one in terms of restrictions to trade, de-
5 Theofanis Christoforou, “The Precautionary Principle and Democ-
ratising Expertise: A European Legal Perspective”, 30 Science and 
Public Policy (2003), pp. 205–213.
6 René Von Schomberg, René, “An Appraisal of the Working in Prac-
tice of Directive 90/220 Concerning the Deliberate Release of Ge-
netically Modified Organisms in the Environment”, STOA report 
of the European Parliament (1998).
7 European Court of Justice, Greenpeace France and Others, Judge-
ment C 6/99, 21 March 2000
8 Ellen Vos, “Antibiotics, the Precautionary Principle and the Court 
of First Instance”, 11 Maastricht Journal of European and Compara-
tive Law (2004), pp. 187–200.
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pending on the normative decision rules (including 
priority setting) employed while exercising such an 
analysis. The costs of particular measures can vary 
considerably in relation to the economic and social 
importance of the issue at stake as well as whether 
the invocation of the precautionary principle would 
lead to interference in planned activities or would 
involve various degrees of remediation. In the latter 
case, it also matters whether alternatives are avail-
able. For example in relation to banning substances 
that depleted the ozone layer there were alternative 
products, while in contrast managing climate change 
requires changing entrenched current practices.
II. The normative dimension of 
assessing scientific uncertainty
The precautionary principle is applied in the context 
of scientific controversy and the acquisition of new 
knowledge. In order to apply the precautionary prin-
ciple properly, a clarification is needed as to what 
is precisely understood by “scientific uncertainty” 
and what types of uncertainties are relevant for 
the invocation of the precautionary principle. This 
section is particularly concerned with the issue of 
how the normative qualifier “reasonable grounds for 
concern” can be used for triggering the precaution-
ary principle. Any scientific advice is surrounded by 
some degree of uncertainty and this in itself is not 
a reason for, nor usually leads to, the invocation of 
the precautionary principle. We can distinguish four 
circumstances. The first type of circumstances relate 
to “hypothetical effects and imaginary risk.” A con-
jectural approach which involves the identification of 
a purely hypothetical risk cannot be considered for 
the invocation of the precautionary principle. Both 
the EC guidelines on the precautionary principle and 
the ruling of the European Court of Justice (T70/99 
for example) exclude such situations and confirm 
that any invocation of the precautionary principle 
should start with a scientific examination of the is-
sue. It involves a mapping or identification of the 
possible adverse effects and is subsequently followed 
by a risk assessment. It is acknowledged that such an 
assessment is not necessarily either complete or con-
clusive in all its details. This scientific examination 
can also include or build upon minority views within 
the scientific field. Minority views, however, do not 
need to be seen in isolation. Scientific evaluations 
work best in the context of independent scientific 
peer review. It speaks for itself that those scientific 
evaluations need to be done in a transparent way 
and that the results should be publicly accessible. 
Thus, the invocation of the precautionary principle 
is always scientifically informed and, procedurally, it 
is mandatory to have such an examination available 
before invoking the precautionary principle.
A second type of circumstance which can be dis-
tinguished relates to the normal situation of a defined 
risk, whereby the level of protection is defined, and 
the risk (e.g. the probability of the occurrence of the 
adverse effects multiplied by their impact) can be 
quantified. In such situations, the policy makers can 
respond with a normal risk management approach 
whereby, for example, thresholds can be set, risks 
can be either minimised or kept below a certain level, 
and precautionary measures can be taken to keep 
particular effects well below particular thresholds by 
employing the ALARA (as low as reasonably achiev-
able) principle. The invocation of the precautionary 
principle is neither necessary nor relevant. Note that 
one can take “precautionary measures” without in-
voking the precautionary principle. Because there is 
scientific consolidated basis concerning the adverse 
effects in question, one can act with preventive (in 
contrast to precautionary) interventions.
The situation becomes completely different when 
one encounters a third type of situation in which one 
cannot fully rely on the scientific information system 
as such when it comes to the estimation of possible 
adverse effects. This is notably the case when an epis-
temic debate is going on in science: e.g. disciplines 
use competing models or analogies or basic assump-
tions to disclose the subject matter under investiga-
tion in order to acquire new knowledge9. In the case 
of long-term effects from the introduction of GMOs, 
for instance, biotechnologists usually refer, by analo-
gy, to the practice of conventional plant breeding as a 
basis for making “predictions” concerning their risks. 
Ecologists, on the contrary refer, also by analogy, to 
experience based on the introduction of particular 
species into new environments (thereby causing 
“problem” plants and pests). This debate even went 
so far that representatives of the different disciplines 
dismissed the relevance of each other’s knowledge 
base for the actual assessment of risks. 
9 See for example: René Von Schomberg, (ed.), Science, Politics and 
Morality: Scientific Uncertainty and Decision Making (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 1993); René Von Schomberg, Der Rationale Umgang mit 
Unsicherheit (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1995). 
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The epistemic debate concerning the long-term 
effects in terms of their predictability will need dec-
ades to be completely resolved: Both the analogies 
of the ecologists and biotechnologists are plausible, 
but refer to a completely different potential scientific 
information base that still needs to be disclosed by 
on-going research. The possible effects of individual 
releases (although one needs to take into account the 
accumulation of many releases over time) may not 
be either fully identifiable, nor be known in their 
scope (in terms of possible negative indirect-effects, 
long term or delayed effects). However these effects 
might be monitored for and practical management 
and monitoring practices could enable an early iden-
tification of unexpected events. Also their degree of 
seriousness can be identified to some extent. Partic-
ular effects may be irreversible, since if transgenes 
are in the environment, then they cannot be easily 
retrieved. The situation is different from a classical 
risk management situation: a precautionary approach 
can be justified.
Less dramatic in terms of scientific debate, but 
with similar relevance for the invocation of the pre-
cautionary principle, are cases relating to a fourth 
type of circumstance when particular cause-effect re-
lationships cannot be scientifically established while 
at the same time the adverse effects are known. The 
withdrawal of the use of particular antibiotics in 
feeding stuffs as well as the protection of the North 
Sea from dumping of waste provides us with such 
examples.
The overview of these four types of circumstances 
establishes the need to have an assessment of the 
state of affairs in science and type of uncertainties 
involved. Drawing the border line, between classi-
cal risk management practice and the situation of a 
purely conjectural risk involves making normative 
choices which need to be made explicit. But even 
more importantly, in the case of epistemic uncer-
tainty, a normative relationship between the nature 
of the uncertainties and the possible adverse effects 
needs to established in order to justify policy and 
regulatory intervention. In assessing the uncertain-
ties involved, normative qualifiers come into play 
while invoking the precautionary principle. It does 
make a difference if the invocation of the precaution-
ary principle needs to be established in relation to 
the anticipated adverse effects: “reasonable grounds 
for concern” (EC communication on the precaution-
ary principle, op cit.), the identification of possible 
harmful effects on health following an assessment 
of available information (Regulation EC 178/2002, 
general principles and requirements of food law) or 
the “balance of evidence”(Intergovernmental Panel 
for Climate Change 2001) or “sufficient evidence for 
safety.”
However it is difficult to outline precisely the 
normative constraints of the type of scientific infor-
mation needed which is “sufficient” to trigger it off. 
Some argue that there is a “degree of likelihood” as-
sociated with those qualifiers10. However, it seems 
misleading that one would be able to assess the “risk” 
of false positives, for example cases where unneces-
sary action will be taken on what later will turn out 
to be fears rather than facts. The uncertainties which 
are usually involved are precisely related to the im-
possibility of assigning a degree of likelihood to the 
anticipated adverse effects. Some of the qualifiers 
belong, to the vocabulary of risk regulation (such as 
“sufficient evidence” or “identified” risk) rather than 
to precautionary practice.
It may be better to relate the normative qualifiers 
to the quality of the available information. This is 
not determined by the amount or degree of uncer-
tainty but relates especially to what type of informa-
tion is known or should be known and of which one 
is ignorant: For example the knowledge concerning 
established cause-effect relationships and the degree 
of necessity to know those relationships in order to 
make a judgement. The qualifier “reasonable grounds 
for concern” as employed by the EC guidelines makes 
no prejudice about the degree of likelihood, but this 
qualifier relates in fact to a judgement on the qual-
ity of the available information. Therefore, it may 
be misleading to situate this qualifier in a scale of 
possible levels, or degrees of proof. It becomes even 
more complicated to take the linguistic connotations 
of suggested “degrees” or “levels” into account. Some 
may feel that this degree needs to be balanced against 
the degree of seriousness of anticipated effects. It sug-
gests that a very serious violation of our chosen level 
of protection would lower our requirements concern-
ing the quality of available scientific information and 
arguments. This is obviously a particular normative 
choice which needs to be justified in relation to other 
possible choices.
10 Poul Harremoës, David Gee, Malcolm MacGarvin, et al. (eds.), 
The Precautionary Principle in the Twentieth Century: Late Lessons 
From Early Warnings (London: Earthscan Publications, 2002).
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III. The choice of transformable 
normative standards
Precautionary regulation always implies the regula-
tion of a subject matter on the basis of standards that 
remain open for discussion, concerning the societal 
acceptability of particular emissions or products. The 
regulation itself cannot define these standards. This 
is a completely new dimension in international envi-
ronmental policy and not always appreciated, but it 
can be illustrated by the case of GMOs.
The European directive on GMOs states: “Mem-
ber States shall, in accordance with the precautionary 
principle, ensure that all appropriate measures are 
taken to avoid adverse effects on human health and 
the environment which might arise from the deliber-
ate release or the placing on the market of GMOs.”11
The directive leaves open what precisely can be con-
sidered as an “adverse effect on human health and 
the environment.” The directive also leaves open 
what could be “a sufficient demonstration of safety,” 
let alone that it requires substantializing the degree 
of uncertainty which could justify restricted use or a 
ban of a particular GMO. The combination of a case 
by case evaluation and the absence of fixed standards 
for evaluating these cases provide the background for 
on-going deliberations at national level and in scien-
tific advisory committees.
Without a normative standard, however, it is im-
possible to draw a valid conclusion on the acceptabil-
ity of a product or a release. Therefore, risk managers 
have to make normative assumptions about which 
products are acceptable or not acceptable. In the case 
of GMOs, the implicit strategy has been to make an 
appeal to a conventional norm, that is to say a stand-
ard which would be acceptable because one can be 
certain it is widely accepted and uncontroversial (and 
would fit to our chosen “high level of protection”). 
What kind of standard would that be? The Dutch ad-
visory committee on genetic modification (COGEM) 
made the following statements in the evaluation of 
the application concerning an herbicide resistant 
rapeseed: “outcrossing transgenic characteristics will 
not cause a persistently negative impact on the envi-
ronment [and] outcrossing the gene and its property 
male sterility ... will not lead to a persistently unac-
ceptable impact of these relatives on the composition 
of varieties in natural vegetation”12.
To draw a conclusion on the acceptability of an 
impact, one has to use phrases with normative im-
plications such as “negative impact” or “unaccepta-
ble impact.” In this case, the advisory committee as-
sumed that a conventional standard, and therefore 
a non-controversial reference point, would be the 
“natural situation” itself. It is assumed that so long 
as any impact would be an impact which could be 
counter-balanced by nature, which would allow na-
ture to return to its original situation, it would be 
an “acceptable impact”. Generally, this conclusion, 
which at first glance seems quite uncontroversial, 
implies that any process or impact caused by releases 
or new agricultural practices would be acceptable if 
one finds that such a process or impact would be an 
instance occurring in nature itself. Indeed, advisory 
committees came to the conclusion that herbicide-
resistant genes, for instance, are widespread in the 
natural environment and that, therefore, a possible 
spread of these genes caused by man-made varieties 
would be an acceptable phenomenon, comparable 
with existing natural processes.
However unproblematic this appeal to a conven-
tional norm seems to be, it soon runs into difficul-
ties when one tries to apply this normative reference 
point, in diverse cases over time. Our knowledge of 
nature is far from complete and our perception of na-
ture changes over time while our scientific knowledge 
grows and our cultural values change. Until several 
years ago, for example, the general belief was that 
gene flow is not a natural phenomenon (and therefore 
unacceptable), but now it has been discovered that it 
occurs under particular circumstance in nature as 
well, which would turn it again into an acceptable im-
pact, provided one agrees that what happens in nature 
is always acceptable. So, further analysis turns our 
“convention” into a transformable normative standard, 
which depends on (and evolves synchronically with) 
the historical change in our perception of nature.
If one analyses the case of GMOs in more detail (see 
footnote 7), one will find that “reduction of biodiver-
sity” is not the only transformable standard which 
can be employed while assessing the acceptability of 
releases. Alternative standards are:
11 Article 4 of European Communities, 2001, Directive 2001/18/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on 
the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified 
organisms and repealing Council directive 90/220/EEC-Commis-
sion Declaration, Official Journal of the European Communities,
L 106, 17 April 2001.
12 COGEM (Dutch Committee on Genetic Modification) (2004), The 
Hague: reference nr C/UK/94/M1/1 public register in the library 
of the Dutch Ministry for the Environment (VROM)
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“Comparison with conventional agricultural prac-
tices,” that is to say, anything that does not yield 
an impact substantially different from the impact 
of existing agricultural practices would account 
for an “acceptable” release.
“Compatibility with sustainable agricultural prac-
tice,” that is to say only those releases which could 
be integrated in a sustainable agricultural practice 
would account for an “acceptable release.”
There seems to be a sort of institutional preference 
to compare alternatives with current practice. How-
ever, before taking current practice as the default 
norm or benchmark, one needs to evaluate whether 
future developments do not allow us to get to poli-
cies which retrospectively define current practices as 
insufficient. The “sustainability” requirement inher-
ently links to such discussions.
In the European context, conflicting scientific as-
sessments among scientific advisory bodies can be 
traced to the normative choice of one those standards 
and the way in which these standard were applied, 
whereas they hardly relate to the probability of ma-
jor environmental impacts. Consensus on such an 
issue seems a matter of agreeing on the standards 
to be used. Up until now, precautionary regulation 
has probably relied too much on an implicit use of 
such standards. The obvious solution for the problem 
is to embark on an open discussion on such stand-
ards. An undefined high level of protection in com-
bination with a precautionary regulatory framework 
forces risk managers to look out for standards which 
are “transformable” by nature in order to make the 
necessary normative conclusions concerning adverse 
effects. Analysis of other complex scientific issues, 
such as climate change, the management of large 
ecosystems etc. involve always the use of such trans-
formable standards. This is a crucial difference from 
the context of classical risk management issues under 
which standards can be pre-defined. In the following 
section I will have a closer look to the relatively new 
field of nanotechnologies
IV. Applying the precautionary 
principle to nanotechnology
Policy development treads a fine line: governments 
should not make the mistake of responding too early 
to a technology, and failing to adequately address 
its nature, or of acting too late, and thereby missing 
the opportunity to intervene. A good governance ap-
proach, then, might be one which allows flexibility in 
responding to new developments. After a regulatory 
review in 2008, the European Commission came to 
the conclusion that there is no immediate need for 
new legislation on nanotechnology, and that adequate 
responses can be developed – especially with regard 
to risk assessment – by adapting existing legislation. 
While, in the absence of a clear consensus on defi-
nitions, the preparation of new nano-specific meas-
ures will be difficult and although there continues 
to be significant scientific uncertainty on the nature 
of the risks involved, good governance will have to 
go beyond policy-making focused on legislative ac-
tion. The power of governments is arguably limited 
by their dependence on the insights and cooperation 
of societal actors when it comes to the governance 
of new technologies: the development of a code of 
conduct, then, is one of their few options for inter-
vening in a timely and responsible manner. In the 
second implementation report on the action plan for 
Nanotechnologies, the Commission states that “its 
effective implementation requires an efficient struc-
ture and coordination, and regular consultation with 
the Member States and all stakeholders”13. Similarly, 
legislators are dependent on scientists’ proactive in-
volvement in communicating the possible risks of 
nanomaterials, and must steer clear of any legislative 
actions which might restrict scientific communica-
tion and reporting on risk. 
The ideal is a situation in which all the actors in-
volved communicate and collaborate. The philosophy 
behind the European Commission’s code of conduct, 
then, is precisely to support and promote active and 
inclusive governance and communication. It assigns 
responsibilities to actors beyond governments, and 
promotes these actors’ active involvement against the 
backdrop of a set of basic and widely shared princi-
ples of governance and ethics. Through codes of con-
duct, governments can allocate tasks and roles to all 
actors involved in technological development, thereby 
organising collective responsibility for the field14. The 
EC Code of Conduct also views Member States of the 
13 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament and the European Econom-
ic Committee: “Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies: An action 
plan for Europe 2005–2009: Second implementation report 2007–
2009”, Brussels, 29.10.2009, COM (2009) 607 final.
14 European Commission, “Recommendation of 7 February 2008 on 
a code of conduct for responsible nanosciences and nanotechnolo-
gies research”, C(2008) 424.
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European Union as responsible actors, and invites 
them to use the Code as an instrument to encourage 
dialogue amongst “policy makers, researchers, indus-
try, ethics committees, civil society organisations and 
society at large” (recommendation number 8 cited on 
page 6 of the Commission’s recommendation in foot-
note 15), as well as to share experiences and to review 
the Code at the European level on a biannual basis. 
The responsible development of new technologies 
must be viewed in its historical context. Some gov-
ernance principles have been inherited from previ-
ous cases: this is particularly notable for the appli-
cation of the precautionary principle to the field of 
nanosciences and nanotechnologies which inherits 
the experience with GMOs. 
The principle runs through legislation that is ap-
plied to nanotechnologies, for example in the “no 
data, no market” principle of the REACH directive 
for chemical substances, or in the pre-market reviews 
required by the Novel Foods regulation. More gener-
ally, within the context of the general principles and 
requirements of the European food law it is acknowl-
edges that “scientific risk assessment alone cannot 
provide the full basis for risk management decisions” 
– leaving open the possibility of risk management 
decision-making partly based on ethical principles 
or particular consumer interests. Regulation (EC) 
no 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general 
principles and requirements of food law, establish-
ing the European Food Safety Authority and laying 
down procedures in matters of food safety states “it is 
recognised that scientific risk assessment alone can-
not, in some cases, provide all the information on 
which a risk management decision should be based, 
and that other factors relevant to the matter under 
consideration should legitimately be taken into ac-
count including societal, economic, traditional, ethi-
cal and environmental factors and the feasibility of 
controls.” Therefore it is also important for policy 
makers to have a good understanding of an ever 
evolving public debate on nanotechnologies in order 
to consider options for public policy15.
In the Code of Conduct, the principle appears in 
the call for risk assessment before any public fund-
ing of research (a strategy currently applied in the 7th
Framework Programme for research). Rather than 
stifling research and innovation, the precautionary 
principle acts within the Code of Conduct as a focus 
for action, in that it calls for funding for the devel-
opment of risk methodologies, the execution of risk 
research, and the active identification of knowledge 
gaps. Under the Framework Programme an obser-
vatory has been funded to create a network for the 
communication and monitoring of risk. The Euro-
pean Commission funded the consortium “Nanocap” 
– featuring deliberation among European NGO’s, 
trade unions and academic researchers which made 
a number of suggestions regarding further building 
blocks for a precautionary approach16. They argued 
consistently with the spirit of EU legislation that the 
“no data, no market” principle should mean in prac-
tice: no data, no exposure. Although it may prove to 
be difficult to establish such a practice, it certainly 
implies the reduction of the exposure to a minimum 
and requires mandatory registration of exposure pro-
cedures at the workplace as long as serious uncertain-
ties persist. As with the case of GMOs, the principle 
can only be implemented meaningfully if we have 
sufficient information from the producers. Therefore 
the authors call for, among other, mandatory notifica-
tion of nano-product composition by manufactures 
and suppliers.
An early example of a precautionary and responsi-
ble practice in the field of nanotechnology is provid-
ed by the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health and 
the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment with 
the introduction of the use of a precautionary matrix 
for synthetic nanomaterials. This precautionary ma-
trix provides a structured method to assess the “na-
nospecific precautionary need” of workers, consum-
ers and the environment arising from the production 
and use of synthetic nanomaterials. The matrix is a 
tool to help trade and industry meet their obligations 
of care and self-monitoring. It helps them to recog-
nise applications which may entail risk and to take 
precautionary measures to protect human health and 
the environment on the basis of a limited number of 
evaluation parameters, including size of the particles, 
their reactivity and stability, their release potential 
and the amount of particles. The matrix is intended 
to enable users to conduct an initial analysis on the 
basis of currently available knowledge and indicates 
when further investigations are necessary. The ma-
15 René Von Schomberg and Sarah Davies (eds.), Understanding Public 
Debate on Nanotechnologies – Options for Framing Public Policy
(Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union, 2010).
16 Peter Van Broekhuizen and Astrid Schwarz, “European Trade Un-
ion and Environmental NGO Positions in the Debate on Nano-
technologies”, in René Von Schomberg and Sarah Davies (eds.), 
Understanding Public Debate on Nanotechnologies, supra note 
15, pp. 81–108.
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trix will be continuously adapted and further devel-
oped in close cooperation with trade, industry and 
science as well as with consumer and environmental 
organisations.
V. Conclusion
Precautionary measures are provisional measures by 
nature, and need to be regularly reviewed when scien-
tific information either calls for relaxation or strength-
ening of those measures. Within the EU context, 
these provisional measures do not have a prefixed 
expiry date: one can only lift precautionary measures 
if scientific knowledge has progressed to a point that 
one would be able to translate former uncertainties in 
terms of risk and adverse effects to terms of defined, 
consensual levels of harm and damage.
Precautionary frameworks facilitate in particular 
deliberation at the science/policy/society interfaces 
to which risk management is fully connected. Ap-
plying the precautionary principle is to be seen as a 
normative risk management exercise which builds 
upon scientific risk assessments. It is therefore not 
imaginable that a proper invocation, implementa-
tion and application of the precautionary principle 
would be based solely on a “perceived” risk. Since 
the application of the precautionary principle starts 
with a (yet incomplete) scientific risk assessment, any 
perceptional element is already initiated with a sci-
entific content. An on-going scientific and normative 
deliberation at the science/policy interface involves a 
shift in science-centred debates on the probability of 
risks towards a science-informed debate on uncer-
tainties and plausible adverse effects: this means that 
decisions should not only be based on available data 
but on a broad scientific knowledge base including a 
variety of scientific disciplines.
The application of transformable standards is an 
inherently discursive process. On each single case 
such standards need to be applied over and over 
again, with possible different outcomes over time. 
These normative standards reflect and should reflect 
the chosen aim of a “high level of protection” as en-
shrined in the EU treaty. In a certain sense, this is 
also a transformable standard in itself, since what is 
considered as “high” changes over time and relates to 
socio-economic circumstances. The impossibility of 
defining fixed standards and operating with neces-
sary open standards is a positive feature of a regu-
latory framework in democratic societies. It invites 
citizens to discuss those standards as they cannot be 
solely defined by risk managers and scientific advis-
ers. The challenge is to interconnect those standards 
with the discussions within scientific committees, 
the risk management level and society at large. Tech-
nology assessment and technology foresight exercis-
es can thereby be helpful to feed such a deliberative 
process. Expertise needs also to be extended with 
forms of knowledge assessments, to assess the nor-
mative quality of the information, in order to identify 
the meaning of particular uncertainties, the quality 
of the available knowledge (which includes knowl-
edge beyond the area of science), and their relevance 
for policy17.
17 René von Schomberg, Angela Guimarães Pereira and Silvio Funto-
wicz, “Deliberating Foresight-Knowledge for Policy and Foresight-
Knowledge Assessment”, European Commission, Directorate Gen-
eral for Research (2005).
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